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This article provides a detailed look at the history of the Gambian Armed Forces 
(GAF), a military that has received very little academic attention within the study of 
African state security forces. It identifies key turning points in the GAF’s history and 
highlights the vastly different role the military played in the state under President 
Jawara (1965-1994) and President Jammeh (1994-2017).  Yet, it also highlights 
important similarities regarding internal patterns within the armed forces and shows 
the ways these continuities may challenge attempts to restructure the security sector. 
The article draws on archival research as well as interviews conducted with retired 




On 1 December 2015, Gambia Radio and Television Service aired a telephone 
call in which President Jammeh congratulated opposition leader Adama Barrow on 
winning the presidential election. Jammeh wished Barrow ‘all the best’ and joked that 
he will spend his political retirement farming.1  This light-hearted announcement of 
Jammeh’s defeat was met with astonishment, in part because it contradicted the tense 
election period. In the run-up to the 2016 election two opposition figures were 
tortured and killed by state security forces after partaking in a demonstration calling 
for electoral reforms. Dozens of others were also arrested.2 Tragically, these cases 
were not exceptional but follow a pattern of intimidation, imprisonment and murder 
of journalists, activists, and opposition figures under Jammeh’s rule.  
 Yet, just one week after conceding defeat Jammeh retracted it and alleged 
‘serious and unacceptable abnormalities’ in the election process.3  Opposition parties, 
professional organisations, and religious groups across The Gambia condemned this 
announcement. Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the United 
Nations (UN) all criticized the move and publicly backed Barrow as the winner of the 
election. Despite his isolation, both within The Gambia and internationally, Jammeh 
refused to accept defeat. The international community, with ECOWAS in the lead, 
attempted numerous rounds of negotiation. The escalating tensions peaked when 
ECOWAS sent a 7,000 troop contingent to the borders of The Gambia with threats to 
force Jammeh to accept defeat. After additional negotiations, Jammeh ultimately 
agreed to concede and left the country for exile in Equatorial Guinea on 21 January 
2017.4 
 Throughout the weeks of the tense election standoff, Jammeh’s key ally was 
the armed forces. When Jammeh initially conceded defeat, the head of the army, 
General Badjie, also congratulated Barrow and offered his allegiance. However, when 
Jammeh backtracked, so did Badjie. The armed forces shortly after seized the 
headquarters of the electoral commission.  In many ways it is unsurprising that the 
armed forces stood by Jammeh. Under his rule, personal loyalty was the central tenant 
of the military, emphasized much more than professional achievements, time-in-
service or education. Yet, as the article will demonstrate, this strategy has also led to a 
fragmented force.  
One of Barrow’s first moves as president was to request ECOWAS forces to 
provide security in The Gambia for his first 6 months in office.5 The request sent a 
clear sign that Barrow was reluctant to trust the Gambian armed forces. As will be 
detailed, a wariness towards the military by political leadership has been a consistent 
trend throughout the history of the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF).  
This article provides a detailed look at the history of the Gambian Armed 
Forces, a military that has received very little academic attention within the study of 
African state security forces. The study of the Gambian military experience adds to an 
understanding of the complex and varying trajectories of militaries in the region. It 
shows ways that the development of armed forces is shaped by the interplay of 
internal political motivations as well as international engagements.  
The article identifies key turning points in the GAF’s history and highlights 
the vastly different role the military played in the state under President Jawara (1965-
1994) and President Jammeh (1994-2017).  Whereas the military could be considered 
marginal under Jawara, it was central to Jammeh’s rule. His highly personal 
involvement in the security services represented a pattern seen throughout the African 
continent of personal rule contributing to weakened military professionalism.6 Yet, 
there are also significant continuities within the armed forces under Jawara and 
Jammeh. While the differences are easier to observe, the similarities require an in-
depth look at internal patterns within the armed forces. The article shows that both 
leaders were distrustful of the military and intentionally limited the development of a 
professional officers corps. The article will conclude by showing the ways in which 
historical patterns in the Gambian Armed Forces will challenge Barrow’s attempts to 
restructure the security sector.  
The analysis draws on archival research carried out in the Gambian National 
Archives.  It also uses interviews conducted with retired and active duty Gambian 
military personnel, government officials, and Gambian scholars. The article focuses 
primarily on the Gambian Armed Forces, which is the military of The Gambia. 
However, attention will also be paid to the wider security structures that were 
established under Jammeh. These include an intelligence agency and a paramilitary 
force, both of which became notorious within The Gambia. Situating the GAF within 
the broader security structure demonstrates the ways that the GAF grew under 
Jammeh but was also counterbalanced.  
 
 
The Creation and Early Years of the Gambian Armed Forces 
 
 Unlike most states in the region, The Gambia did not immediately create a 
military upon independence in 1965. Security was the responsibility of a small 
paramilitary force, called the Field Force, alongside a police force.  The Field Force, 
formed in 1958 out of the Gambian regiment of the Royal West African Frontier 
Force (RWAFF), totalled only 140 men at independence and increased to around 500 
by the early 1980s.7 There was little concern over the absence of a military at the time 
due to The Gambia’s small size and its generally peaceful relationship with its only 
neighbour, Senegal.  Additionally, a defence agreement was signed in 1965 between 
The Gambia and Senegal, which provided mutual assistance in the face of an external 
threat.8 
 While this arrangement worked well through the 1960s and 1970s, it was first 
seriously tested in 1981 when Jawara experienced a coup attempt and the country 
suffered its most violent upheaval to date. The attempt to overthrow Jawara was 
orchestrated by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a civilian who had been an unsuccessful 
candidate in the 1977 parliamentary election and known for espousing radical leftist 
views.9  While several members of the Field Force were involved, they were not the 
majority of the leaders.  The remaining individuals varied in their educational 
background and professions, with a sizeable number working as taxi drivers, giving 
the event the nickname ‘the taxi driver coup.’10   
After breaking into the Field Force armoury, the rebel elements released all 
prisoners from Mile Two prison and distributed rifles and ammunition to anyone they 
felt was on their side.11  Instead of supporting the rebels, many who had acquired 
weapons carried out personal vendettas, further undermining the efforts of the rebels 
who already lacked widespread support. 12   The coup plotters took other extreme 
measures that surely led to a loss of credibility such as holding Jawara’s wife and 
eight children hostage and threatening them live over the radio.13  Kukoi and his co-
conspirators soon lost control of the situation and the plan to take Banjul was 
sidetracked by widespread looting, robbery, and killing.14  The majority of the Field 
Force was not quick to counter the rebels; instead they remained neutral and waited 
for the dust to clear before choosing a side. 
Jawara requested the assistance of Senegal under the mutual defence 
agreement. Senegal responded quickly, sending in hundreds of soldiers including 
airborne and sea assault units.15  In four days the coup was aborted but cost the lives 
of 33 Senegalese soldiers and an estimated 500 Gambians, many of whom were 
civilians uninvolved in the fighting.  This coup attempt contrasts with general patterns 
that show that coups in Africa are usually short in duration and cause limited 
immediate loss of life.16  The severity of the situation, especially in contrast to The 
Gambia’s history of stability, can help explain the major changes enacted by the 
government following the attempt. 
 The coup attempt helped prompt the creation of the Gambian Armed Forces.  
Only a few months after the incident, President Jawara and President Diouf of 
Senegal signed the Kaur Declaration leading to the creation of the Senegambia 
Confederation.  This confederation aimed to integrate the security forces of Senegal 
and The Gambia as well as create an economic and monetary union and would serve 
to coordinate issues of foreign policy.17  In order to integrate the two countries’ armed 
forces, Gambia had to first create a military.   
It is important to note that Jawara had been in power for 17 years before 
establishing a military and prior to the coup attempt believed an army was not 
necessary for The Gambia.  Although he appeared supportive of the Senegambia 
Confederation, he never seemed fully comfortable with the idea of the Gambian 
Armed Forces and emphasized that the military should be kept ‘as small as 
possible.’18  His unease was probably due to regional and continental patterns of 
military interventions into politics. At the time of the creation of the Gambian 
military, the majority of West African states were under leaders who came to power 
through a military coup. Jawara surely recognized the pattern and likely viewed the 
military from its inception as a potential threat.  
The Gambian National Army (GNA) was developed by merging the existing 
loyal members of the Field Force with new recruits and officially came into existence 
with the passing of the Gambian Armed Forces Act in 1985.19  The new organization 
was set up and trained by a British training team.  Around the same time, the 
Gambian National Gendarmerie (GNG), a force separate from the GNA, was 
established based on a French military model and trained primarily by the 
Senegalese.20  This hybrid of British and French military structures used to create the 
Gambian Armed Forces led to confused roles and an often-contentious relationship 
between the army and gendarmerie.21  Within five years of the 1981 coup attempt, 
Gambia went from having little more than a police force to having armed forces 
comprising an army and gendarmerie alongside the police. 
The Senegambia Confederal Agreement created a Confederal Army, separate 
from the regular armed forces of Senegal and The Gambia.  The Confederal Army 
was made up of two-thirds Senegalese soldiers and one-third Gambian soldiers with 
the ability to deploy anywhere within the confederation. Gambian soldiers chosen for 
the Confederal Army were given the same pay grade as the Senegalese soldiers, 
which was significantly more than the normal pay rate for the Gambian military.22  
This ‘financial advantage made it the dream assignment of every Gambian soldier.’23  
However, it caused disparities in pay within the new Gambian army and soldiers 
‘complained of gross differences in income and privileges’ as a result of the 
Confederal Army.24  One former soldier explained, ‘We were seeing that some of us 
are treated better than others and that is very dangerous in the army.’25  Furthermore, 
it was a pay scale that the Gambian military could not sustain after the Senegambia 
Confederation disbanded in 1989.   
There were also accusations of favouritism and nepotism in the selection 
process for the Confederal Army.26  The Senegalese military at the time had a longer 
history and higher standards for recruitment and Gambian soldiers selected for the 
Confederal Army were supposed to match the standard. 27 However, former soldiers 
noted that in reality the way to get chosen for the Confederal Army was to know one 
of the Gambian selecting officers. In an interview with a former Confederal Army 
soldier he laughingly said, “if it was not for corruption, I would not have been in the 
[Confederal] army.”  He explained that he did not meet the standard criteria but he 
knew someone that assigned him a spot.28  This favouritism, which began from the 
very start of the Gambian Armed Force’s existence, likely undermined the integrity of 
the officer corps.  Furthermore it weakened the hierarchical structures by providing 
privileges based on personal links rather than on rank or merit, a pattern that has 
continued within the GAF. 
Even when the Gambian soldiers joined the Senegambia Confederation, they 
were junior to their Senegalese colleagues as a result of their newly appointed ranks.  
Due to the vastly different size of the Gambian and Senegalese populations, Senegal 
also contributed more resources and troops.29  Furthermore, the key tasks of guarding 
the airport, port, and Gambian president were given to Senegalese troops.30  Gambian 
soldiers said that at the time they saw potential personal benefits to the Confederal 
Army, but some also saw it as an insult to their national pride not to have full 
responsibility of protecting the nation. 31   Political opposition parties claimed the 
confederation was a threat to national sovereignty and economically disadvantageous 
to the Gambian citizens.32 
Individuals with doubt about the agreement did not have to wait long for the 
Condeferation to come to an end, which is did suddenly in 1989, over a dispute 
regarding the rotation of the Confederal presidency.33  In August of 1989 Senegal 
removed the 300 Senegalese troops stationed in The Gambia as part of the 
Senegambia Confederation without prior warning.34  President Jawara explained that 
he only found out about the withdrawal of troops when he arrived at work and found 
that there were no Presidential Guards present.35  The Senegalese Minister of Defence 
justified the withdrawal by reasoning that the Senegalese soldiers were needed to deal 
with an emerging issue on the border with Mauritania. 36   Gambia responded by 
initiating the legal measures to dissolve the confederation.37  Thus the Senegambia 
Confederation ended less than seven years after it was formed. 
The withdrawal of the Senegalese troops meant Jawara was finally dependent 
on his armed forces for both internal and external protection.  This was the first time 
since the army’s creation that it had not been under foreign leadership. Gambia’s 
involvement in the Confederal Army, especially in the early stages of the military’s 
existence may have sowed the initial seeds of discontent within the military.   It 
created divisions within the armed forces by giving some soldiers more pay and 
prestige. Additionally, the accusations of corrupt practices within the officer corps 
during Confederal Army period did not end with the termination of the Senegambia 
confederation.  
  
Warning of Growing Discontent 
 
At the same time that the Senegambia Confederation was winding down, 
insecurity in Liberia was intensifying.  In 1990 the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), of which The Gambia is a member, decided to send 
troops to Liberia under the title ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).  In August 
1990, 105 Gambian soldiers were deployed to Monrovia, alongside Ghanaian, 
Nigerian, Guinean, and Sierra Leonean troops.38  This was the Gambian military’s 
first involvement in a peacekeeping mission and the deployment was a controversial 
issue within The Gambia.  Newspapers questioned the goal of the mission and some 
military members expressed doubt as to whether the military was adequately 
prepared.39   
 The Liberia mission was difficult and dangerous for even the experienced 
militaries in the region and the Gambian military was further disadvantaged by its 
infancy.  A former Commander of the GNA explained that the Gambian peacekeeping 
unit was inexperienced and underprepared, while another former officer noted that the 
unit stood no chance against rebels who were trained and motivate to fight.40  During 
the initial deployment, two Gambian soldiers, Corporal Modou Bojang and Private 
Sama Jawo, were killed.41   
 The first Gambian ECOMOG contingent returned home on April 13, 1991.  
Two months after their return soldiers from the unit took to the streets, arriving at 
State House in Banjul to express their dissatisfaction, primarily over claims that they 
had not been paid their due deployment allowances.42  This was the first mutiny in 
The Gambia and President Jawara quickly agreed to meet with the soldiers about their 
complaints.43 He promised to pay the mutineers the allowances they were owed and to 
look into their other requests.44  Additionally, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 
Gambian National Army, Colonel Momodou Ndow Njie was retired directly 
following the mutiny, indicating that the government took the revolt seriously.45  
 While the peacekeeping mutiny appeared to be handled efficiently, decisions 
that followed from the event marked a turning point in the Gambian Armed Forces.  
Less than a month after news of Njie’s departure, the government announced that the 
Nigerian Army Training Assistance Group (NATAG) would soon be arriving in The 
Gambia to help train and equip the army.  The especially unusual aspect of the 
NATAG arrangement was that the top Nigerian officer, Colonel (later promoted to 
Brigadier General) Abubakar Dada was appointed Commanding Officer of the 
Gambian National Army.  Soldiers at the time remember being ‘shocked’ by the 
decision.46  The move to bring in another foreign contingent was a controversial one 
from the start and the idea of having the national military headed by a foreign officer 
was especially contentious.  Gambian media at the time criticized the decision.  For 
example, one paper listed every individual in the Gambian military from the rank of 
Captain and above, pointed out their long and decorated service and then posed the 
question ‘Is the government telling us that none of these people are competent enough 
to head the army?’47  The departure of Colonel Njie was due to the fact that he had 
lost the confidence of his men.  However, Jawara did little to restore this confidence 
or develop leadership within the Gambian military.  Instead he appeared more 
comfortable with having foreign military personnel lead the Gambian Armed Forces.   
 Although the government announced the NATAG plan almost immediately 
after the mutiny in June of 1991, it took about nine months for the seventy-nine 
member contingent to arrive.48  In the meantime The Gambia endured its second 
mutiny.  This event was a near repeat of the first mutiny. It involved the second 
contingent of peacekeepers to return from Liberia and their complaints mirrored those 
of the first group of mutineers.49  
The mutinying peacekeepers in 1991 and 1992 were the first to publicly 
expose the growing sense of distrust within the ranks and between the military and 
government. The peacekeepers did not believe the government’s claim that they did 
not have the money available to pay the peacekeepers, but rather they thought that 
‘the senior officers were robbing them.’ 50   The complaints about deployment 
payments was specific to the ECOMOG soldiers but their accusations of corruption 
and mismanagement resonated with others in the military, particularly junior officers.  
Promotions were often seen to be based on favouritism, which further eroded the 
soldiers’ confidence in the hierarchy.51  One former soldier stated that the senior 
officers ‘did not have control and we did not respect them.’52  The accusations by the 
soldiers were similar to complaints circulating in the civilian sector concerning 
‘widespread disapproval with the regime, in part due to increased corruption.’53 
In addition to these general complaints were more specific grievances related 
to the NATAG presence. Lt Col (Ret.) Sarr explains ‘the final straw was when the 
government reduced us to nonentities and brought in Nigerians to command and 
control us.’54  Gambian officers complained about the better accommodations, cars, 
and pay the Nigerians received as well as other fringe benefits such as free fuel.55  
The Gambians were not just envious of the Nigerians’ material benefits; they felt that 
their presence was directly detrimental to their own careers.  The Nigerians held all of 
the highest positions, with no Gambians above the rank of a Major.56  In addition to 
the public displays of dissatisfaction, there were other indications of morale problems 
in the military at the time.  For example, Gambian media in 1993 reported on the 
‘alarming’ number of soldiers who were voluntarily leaving the military after a short 
period of service.57 
One other important aspect of discontent among many Gambian military 
personnel at the time was the disbanding of the Gambian National Gendarmerie. 
While the gendarmerie and army trained separately they were relatively equally 
funded and served as a counter weight to each other.58  For example, it was the 
gendarmerie who countered the 1991 and 1992 mutinies amongst army members.  
However, in 1992 the government decided to disband the gendarmerie and merge the 
members into a unit within the police force called the Tactical Support Group 
(TSG).59  For those personnel who were in the gendarmerie, this was an unpopular 
decision because the police received less funding and equipment than the army and 
was generally seen as less prestigious.60  Soldiers blamed the decision to disband the 
gendarmerie on the Nigerians, who were advising the Gambian government on 
military matters at the time.61  Furthermore, Gambian soldiers have retrospectively 
blamed the Nigerians for over-arming the Gambian National Army.62   Numerous 
former soldiers argue that disbanding the gendarmerie caused the 1994 coup to be a 
‘fait accompli’ because there was no counterweight against the army.63   
The mutinies in 1991 and 1992 had given Jawara two warnings of the 
problems within the military but more drastic measures were taken on the third revolt, 
which occurred in 1994.  On the morning of July 22nd 1994 President Jawara was at 
his office in State House when he received a report that armed soldiers were on their 
way to State House.  The soldiers far outnumbered and out armed the small 
contingent of Presidential Guards at State House that day and Jawara quickly fled. 
The soldiers briefly exchanged fire with the TSG and after overpowering the 
police quickly moved to Banjul.64 Therefore with limited internal resistance and a 
president who had already departed, the soldiers had no trouble taking over the state.  
The whole affair was over by midday, with no bloodshed. The soldiers made the 
obligatory announcement over the radio that the constitution was suspended and a 
curfew was in place.  Thus marking ‘the demise of the longest continuously surviving 
multiparty democracy in Africa’ at the time as well as unseating the continent’s 




New Leadership with New Emphasis on the GAF 
 
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was announced as the head of the new ruling 
council, named the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). The initial 
press announcement listed ‘rampant corruption and the retrogressive nature of the 
country’ as the cause of the coup.66  While Jammeh marketed the coup as an action 
that was necessary to protect the national interest, it was also likely motivated by a 
desire to protect the interests of the military and fuelled by personal aspirations.  
When Jammeh first came to power in the 1994 coup, decision-making was 
grounded in the AFPRC, which consisted of five junior military officers (including 
Jammeh).67  While civilians were appointed to many of the ministerial and cabinet 
positions, decisions were regularly issued through military decrees, of which at least 
70 were made in the first two years following the coup.68  After twenty-six months in 
power, Jammeh retired from the military and was elected as president of The Gambia 
in 1996.  Even before this election he had begun to replace his public image as a 
military commander in fatigues with one of a religious figure in traditional robes.69  
Despite this image shift, Jammeh remained consistently engaged with the military.  
Jammeh had served in both the GNG (1984-1991) and GNA (1991-1996), first 
joining the military as a private and later commissioned as an officer. In an interview 
with a junior soldier at the military headquarters in Banjul in 2012, regarding Jammeh 
the soldier stated ‘he is one of us, you know what we say, once a soldier always a 
soldier.’70  This is a good representation of how the military viewed Jammeh and 
likely how Jammeh viewed himself.  
Whereas Jawara was accused of neglecting the military, the same cannot be 
said about Jammeh.  Upon coming to power, Jammeh immediately set out to ease 
some of the dissatisfaction within the military that had built up during the Jawara 
years.  Promotions and pay raises were awarded to the armed forces and 
improvements were made to the Yundum barracks.71 Additionally, the Gambia Army 
Revolving Loan Scheme was developed to provide cheap loans to soldiers.72  Military 
personnel were offered educational opportunities and security forces received special 
treatment over the allocation of land for residential purposes. 73   The NATAG 
contingent that had been unpopular within the military under Jawara left The Gambia 
following the coup.74   
In addition to material perks, Jammeh expanded the Armed Forces structure.  
This pattern began almost immediately upon coming to power and has continued later 
into his time in office.  For example, in 1995 Jammeh announced his intention to 
establish a Navy and the organisation came into fruition in 1997.75  More recently, 
The Gambia Armed Forces Bill of 2008 established the National Guards along with 
several specialized units under their structure.  The new units were reported to be a 
response to emerging security threats, such as terrorism and cross-border crimes.76  
However, in practice they were more associated with providing protection for 
President Jammeh. Under Jammeh the Gambian Armed Forces included the Army, 
Navy, and National Guards. The GAF is led by the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) with 
the president as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. While the exact size of 
the GAF is difficult to determine, experts on the Gambia such as David Perfect have 
estimated it at 2,500 as of 2016.77 
Jammeh remained focused on the military during his twenty-two years in 
power and on a material level the military appeared well taken care of.  This is in part 
due to financial assistance from foreign partners. Jammeh maintained various defence 
partnerships, which provided the military with training, education, and material 
benefits.  Gambia’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, which began soon after the 
coup and lasted until 2013, had many benefits for the military.  Taiwan provided 
regular training to the Gambian forces and scholarships for Gambian officers at 
Taiwanese military academies.  They donated uniforms, high-speed boats, and funded 
the building of a new training centre and improvements to the Yundum barracks.78  
Turkey has also been a key defence partner for The Gambian Armed Forces.  The 
Turkish-Gambian partnership began under Jawara but increased under Jammeh’s rule.  
Turkish trainers were involved in training an estimated 5,000 Gambian troops 
between 1991 and 2005 and around 60 Gambian officers and NCOs were sent to 
Turkey for training. 79   While the formal training agreement ended in 2005, new 
bilateral training and security agreements were signed between Turkey and Gambia in 
2014, with particular emphasis on the Navy.  The new agreement also involved a 
donation of $US600,000 to assist the Gambian Armed Forces with logistics.80   
In recent years Western governments have become increasingly focused on 
strengthening West Africa’s efforts to combat transnational crimes such as smuggling 
and terrorism.  As a result the Gambian Armed Forces have been involved in regional 
and international training and exercises.  For example, they have hosted British and 
American military training teams and Banjul was the main exercise site for the 
African Endeavour Exercise organized by U.S. Africa Command in 2011.  Since the 
early 2000s The Gambia has roughly 200 troops deployed at any given time on 
international peace operations. In the early 2000s Gambian troops participated in 
missions in Liberia (first under ECOMIL and then UNMIL) but since 2004 their 
involvement is almost exclusively with the UNAMID mission to Darfur, Sudan.81 
Generally opportunities to particulate in multinational exercises and peace operations 
are seen in a positive light by military personnel as they provide international 
engagement and at times additional supplemental pay. 
 
 
An Expanded Force with Increasing Divisions 
 
While the military was never central to the way Jawara led, the military 
became vital to the Jammeh regime. It would be easy to assume that Jammeh’s past as 
a military officer made the organisation his most preferred ally. However, a closer 
look at the wider security sector and the internal workings of the armed forces 
suggests a more complex picture.  
While Jammeh expanded the GAF, as described above, he has also created 
additional security services, which likely serve to balance if not counter the strength 
of the military. In 1995 he ordered the creation of the National Intelligence Agency 
(NIA).  The decree stated that NIA’s purpose was to ‘obtain and provide the 
Government with information relating to actions or intentions of persons which may 
be a threat to state security.’82  The organization reported directly to the President, and 
had surveillance and arrest authority. The NIA was initially suspected to have been 
created to monitor dissent within the GAF.83 Yet, the organization soon began to 
focus on all form of opposition to Jammeh. The NIA became notorious and is marred 
with accusations of numerous well-documented cases of human right violations.84 The 
UN Special Rapporteur who investigated torture in The Gambia in 2014 ‘found that 
torture is a consistent practice carried out by the National Intelligence Agency. In 
cases where there is a real or perceived threat to national security there is a 
corresponding increase in acts of torture and ill-treatment during the detention and 
arrest process.’85 
There have also been numerous reports by journalists and human rights 
organisations, including the UN, regarding the existence of a paramilitary referred to 
as the ‘Jungulars.’86 The Jungulars were not officially part of the GAF or NIA and 
their exact role or numbers is unclear but they were alleged to have worked directly 
for Jammeh. In international media reporting and interviews they have been referred 
to as a ‘hit squad’, ‘personal security force’ for Jammeh, and an ‘assassination 
team.’87 These terms give an indication of the brutality and extrajudicial nature of this 
unit.  They were suspected to have worked directly for Jammeh. 
The opaque nature of the NIA, and especially the Jungulars, is indicative of 
the way the security forces have developed under Jammeh. While there is a level of 
secrecy surrounding the security sector in most states, there has been a particular lack 
of transparency under Jammeh.  This is partially due to a decrease in press freedoms.  
During the Jawara’s leadership military issues or opinion pieces about the armed 
forces were often reported in the press.  Even military court martials were often open 
to the public.  However under Jammeh it was rare to see independent reporting about 
security matters in the Gambian media. This makes it very difficult to determine the 
relationships between the various security entities. International human rights 
reporting also regularly discusses abuses within the security services, without 
differentiating between the military, NIA, or paramilitary forces. The confusion 
between the various arms of the security services also extends within The Gambia and 
many Gambians came to view all security forces with trepidation. Yet more clarity 
about the actions of the Jungulars and NIA may be on the horizon. Within weeks of 
Barrow coming to office, several members of the NIA, including the head of the 
organisation, and member of the Jungulars were arrested.88 These arrests may bring to 
light new details about the inner works of these organisations and their domestic or 
international links. 
An examination of patterns within the GAF also indicates that while Jammeh 
may be a ‘military man’ he had a tumultuous relationship with the force.  Although 
the security services were key to limiting opposition and criticism of Jammeh, the 
GAF were also the most serious threat to his position. Charges of disloyalty within the 
military began almost immediately after Jammeh came to power.  One of the first and 
most severe allegations of internal dissent within the armed forces occurred in 
November of 1994 when Jammeh announced that armed factions within the military 
had attempted to overthrow the president. 89   The attempt was said to have been 
orchestrated by junior officers and resulted in the death of around thirty soldiers.90  
The government claimed the soldiers were killed by loyal forces during an operation 
to counter the attempt but there is widespread belief that they were executed.91  Just 
months after this alleged attempt, military divisions at the highest level were exposed 
in January 1995 when two members of the AFPRC were arrested and charged of 
plotting to assassinate Jammeh.92 
Accusations of plots against Jammeh cannot be attributed to the uncertainty of 
the period following the coup; it is a trend that persisted.  Additional coup plots and 
attempts were reportedly uncovered in 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2014.  
This list of alleged coup attempts and plots likely includes both imagined attempts, 
which served as a way for Jammeh to purge potential opposition, but also include 
actual threats to Jammeh’s position from within the armed forces.  The 2006 plot is a 
strong example of the latter.  It allegedly involved both the Army Chief of Defence 
Staff, Colonel Ndure Cham, and Director of the NIA, Mr. Daba Marenah, 
symbolizing divisions and dissatisfaction at the top levels of the hierarchy.  While 
Colonel Ndure Cham escaped at the time, Mr Daba Marenah along with at least four 
military personnel accused of involvement were allegedly executed while other 
accused were given prison sentences and reportedly tortured.93   
The 2014 attempt to overthrow Jammeh illustrated that the grievances against 
him extend well beyond the military.  This coup attempt was allegedly funded and 
organized by several members of the Gambian diaspora in the US and carried out by 
Lt.Col. (Ret.) Lamin Sanneh.94  Sanneh had previously served as Commander of the 
National Guards from 2012 to 2013 before he was removed from the position and 
emigrated to the US. Sanneh and three other former members of the Gambian Armed 
Forces were killed by soldiers loyal to Jammeh when they attempted to enter State 
House.95 While Jammeh labelled the incident a ‘terrorist attack’ by foreign dissidents, 
suspicion regarding involvement from within the military led to arrests and court 
martials of Gambian soldiers.96 Along with the military detentions, dozens of civilians 
were arrested including members of Sanneh’s family. 97 
The aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 attempts to oust Jammeh were indicative 
of the general pattern of mass arrests and disappearances of military personnel (and at 
times civilian) that usually followed coup attempts in The Gambia. The lack of 
transparency in trials of accused coup plotters, manipulation of ‘confessions,’ and/or 
lack of trials completely (at times due to quick executions/disappearance of accused) 
makes it difficult to unravel the truths from allegations, rumours, and half-truths 
concerning plans to oust Jammeh. 
Positions and promotions were important tools for rewards and punishments, 
particularly among the officers corps.  Jammeh was suspected to have been heavily 
involved in most of the decisions regarding appointments, highlighting the personal 
nature of his relationship with the Gambian Armed Forces.  Key positions in the 
military were typically appointed to those most loyal to Jammeh.  Additionally, there 
are numerous examples of promotions involving jumping ranks (even being promoted 
from enlisted to officer ranks) rather than progressing gradually through the standard 
rank structure.98  However, just as soldiers were often quickly promoted, demotions 
were also a regular occurrence. This manipulation of the rank structure likely created 
an intentional sense of insecurity within the military and further emphasized loyalty 
over merit or time in service.   
Although rapid promotions allowed some favoured individuals to reach the 
top of the hierarchy quickly, senior positions in the security services were far from 
secure. Jammeh’s suspicions of military leadership, even those he was closest with 
began almost immediately upon taking power.  Just days after assigning cabinet 
positions, Jammeh had two of his ministers (both military officers) arrested for 
allegedly remaining loyal to Jawara.99  The pattern continued and regular dismissals 
or circulation of positions for senior officers were an ongoing trend within the 
Gambian armed forces under Jammeh.  This was likely meant to keep any individual 
from becoming too powerful and threatening Jammeh’s position. While it may sound 
like a risky strategy to dismiss top generals, many of those ‘dismissed’ from the 
military were given civilian jobs within the government, at times in lucrative positions 
abroad. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army, NIA, and Police have all 
at times been headed by retired military officers, providing former officers with 
continued influence and opportunities after their military retirement.100 
Jammeh often gave preference to his own ethnic group, the Jola, for top jobs 
within the GAF. For example, many of the individuals who have held the position of 
Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) have been Jola, including Baboucarr Jatta (1999-2004), 
Lang Tombong Tamba (2005-2009) and Ousman Badjie (2012-2017).  A similar 
pattern can be found with the leadership positions of the NIA and police, as well as 
divisions of the GAF like the Navy and National Guards.101 The favouritism is alleged 
to continue down the chain of commander with claims that Jolas junior ranks receive 
disproportionate opportunities for overseas assignments such as positions on 
peacekeeping missions.102 The Jola are a small ethnic group in The Gambia, with 
2003 estimates suggesting that they make up around eleven percent of the 
population.103 Thus the high number of Jola in senior positions is suspected to have 
created internal divisions and resentment in the military between the Jola and non-
Jola.104  Ethnic favouritism is another way it which the military changed between the 
Jawara era and Jammeh, as ethnicity was not previously considered to be a main point 
of contention in the GAF under Jawara.105   
While the Jola were considered preferred within the security services, they 
were not above suspicion. There are cases of Jola officers being arrested and tried for 
perceived infractions. One of the most high-profile examples is the treason trial 
against Jola former CDS Lang Tombong Tamba. In 2011 he was convicted for 
withholding information about a coup plot and remained in prison until 2015, when 
he was pardoned by Jammeh.  
There have also long been rumours that part of Jammeh’s loyalty campaign 
involves recruiting Senegalese members of the rebel group Mouvement des forces 
démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) into the Gambian security forces. The 
MFDC is a separatist rebellion based in the Casamance region of Senegal dominated 
by Jola. Jammeh has been accused of arming the MFDC and harbouring members of 
the group, which resulted in a significantly strained relationship between The Gambia 
and Senegal.106  While rumours of recruitment of Jola MFDC into the GAF and 
Jungulars are hard to prove, they would fit with the larger pattern of ethnic preference 
in the security forces. It is alleged that these individuals were the most faithful to 
Jammeh as they do not identify as Gambians and are less likely to be swayed by 
political opposition or international criticism.  
Jammeh has often been described as erratic, unpredictable, and even crazy in 
part due to a tendency for surprising announcements. For example, in the final years 
of his rule he announced the country’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the 
International Criminal Court. He declared the The Gambia an Islamic state, changed 
the workweek to four days and ordered the end of English as the official language. In 
many ways the constant rotation of security personnel may also seem to be linked to 
this pattern of rash decisions. Yet, when looked at across time, Jammeh’s endless 
reappointments firings, and trials within the security forces are not hasty choices but 
rather was part of a careful manipulation of the state security structure, which 
emphasized loyalty while limiting the power of any individual officer who could 





In many ways the Gambian Armed Forces played very different roles under 
the leadership of President Jawara and President Jammeh.  Jawara appeared reluctant 
to create an armed forces and when he did the military was kept small and marginal.  
Jawara was unengaged with military matters and kept the military focused externally, 
with involvement in the Senegambia Confederation and deployments to West African 
peace operations. Jammeh, however, took the opposite approach.  He expanded the 
structure of the Gambian Armed Forces and added other security agencies. He was 
personally engaged in military affairs, giving the sense that he micro-managed many 
of the internal matters, particularly appointments. Significantly, the state security 
sector, including but not limited to the GAF, was heavily focused internally and 
largely served as regime protection. Whereas there were few indications of a negative 
civil-military relationship during Jawara years, the security services under Jammeh 
has been accused of numerous abuses against the civilian population in Gambia.   
Despite the changes, there are also continuities within the GAF under both 
administrations.  Both leaders were suspicious of the armed forces during their time in 
office and each put measures in place that prohibited the development of a cohesive 
military and professional officers corps. Jawara responded to his unease by remaining 
aloof to military matters and relying on international military leadership. This resulted 
in limited career progression within the army and ultimately was a factor in the coup 
against him. The structures under the Confederal Army and the NATAG agreement 
created early divisions and resentments within the GAF, which continued into later 
years. 
 Jammeh’s approach to the military was more intimate and elaborate. In his 
twenty-two year reign Jammeh expanded the GAF and developed additional security 
agencies such as the NIA and a paramilitary. Yet this expansion intentionally created 
divisions in the armed forces.  The various sectors of the security services served as a 
counter to each other while a murky network of informants kept many soldiers wary. 
Additional divisions centred on ethnic preferences and related resentments. Frequent 
trials against military personnel regularly pitted officers against each other, further 
dividing the military and weakening chains of command.  Yet just as security officers 
were highly scrutinized under Jammeh, he was also responsible for pardoning and 
reappointing those who had earlier been accused. This precarious state likely led to a 
mixed sense of fear and gratefulness. Careers were primarily advanced through 
loyalty to Jammeh, not through officer’s skills or military achievement. 
Barrow has inherited a security structure built on loyalty to Jammeh and thus 
his early reluctance for ECOWAS forces to leave is understandable. Within the first 
few weeks he announced plans for changes to the security forces. For example, 
Barrow said he would not disband the NIA but would rename the organisation and 
remove their arrest authority. He also declared the appointment of former CDS 
Masaneh Kinteh as his military aid to advise on military matters, as Barrow does not 
have any previous military experience. There has been some criticism that the 
changes are not radical enough to improve the image of the security services and 
rebuild the public’s trust in the forces. Yet early moves demonstrate a measured 
response that acknowledges the need for change without hasty decisions that could 
isolate or further divide the forces. This will remain a delicate balance for Barrow, 
especially as proposed ideas for a truth and reconciliation programme will likely 
highlight the many abuses by security forces. Any overhaul of the security services 
will remain a long-term project as a ‘new’ structure will have to mend and reconcile 
what have become very fragmented forces.  
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